

Why did DPP
include
these documents?

- Perhaps to show
- ① degree of organization?
 - ② cooperation attitude & policy at time?

W FILE / SUBJ.
DATE / SUB-CAT.

7/72

SRV

1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
2. SUBJECT: Planned Activities, Thủ Biên Sub-Region Party Committee, COSVN. (U)
3. ISC NUMBER: A747.000
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 6 Jul 72
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 24 Aug 72
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT
8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 UJ20 1C
9. DATE OF REPORT: 27 October 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1D, 1D1, 1D2
12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)
13. PREPARED BY: Noel C. Bess, SFC, E7
PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Michael D. Blase CPT
for GILBERT McDONALD, MAJ, USA
DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns Directive 10, classified ((VC)) Top Secret, signed by Nguyễn Văn Trú for the Current Affairs Committee of the ((possibly Thu Bien)) Sub-Region, ((COSVN)), pertaining to friendly ((VC)) activities during the second quarter of 1972 and friendly missions during Jul and Aug 72 ((within the Thủ Biên Sub-Region)).

(Leave Blank)

(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 24 Aug 72 in South Vietnam (XT774200; RVN MR 3) by the 224th RF Co, RVN MR 3. The document was received at CDEC on 26 Sep 72, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 50,206, dated 29 Sep 72, under CDEC Document Log Number 09-1255-72. Translation was requested by CDEC for JUSPAO, Vietnam.

THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT FOR CAPTURE DATA, ALL REFERENCES TO THE COMBINED DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION CENTER (CDEC), CDEC PERSONNEL, CDEC COMMENTS, LOG NUMBERS, REMARKS INDICATED BY DOUBLE PARENTHESES, AND THE DECIPHERING OF CODE WORDS, COVER DESIGNATORS, AND ENEMY UNITS, WAS DECLASSIFIED ON 27 OCT 72 BY Michael D. Blase, CPT for DIR, US ELM, CDEC. THIS

HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR ON MICROFILM

CDEC Doc Log No. 09-1255-72

----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

((Page 1 of O.T.))

((VC)) ABSOLUTE SECRET

DIRECTIVE No. 10

Develop the victories in Jun ((72)) and heighten determination to accomplish the missions in Jul and Aug 72. Intensify attacks against the enemy; step up mass uprisings to expand liberated areas; and gain control in many areas.

I. SITUATION IN JUN 72

A. We have developed the victories gained in Apr and May 72 and have achieved more in Jun 72.

Our armed forces have made new progress in attacking the enemy. They have conducted larger-scale attacks and have damaged and destroyed more enemy personnel and war facilities than we did in May 72. They have caused casualties to the 306th Regional Force Bn and disorganized four Regional Force groups in CT ((possibly Châu Thành)), Bến Cát, Phú Giao, and Long Khanh Districts (one C ((possibly company)) of the Regional Force in Bến Cát District was destroyed). They have worn down and disorganized enemy Popular Forces, Police Forces, and People's Self-Defense Forces in many posts in Lái Thiêu, Châu Thành, and Phước Vĩnh Districts and areas surrounding Thủ Dầu Một City. They have heavily destroyed the enemy's storage facilities and put 740 enemy troops out of action, thus weakening his organic mobile forces in local areas.

The people have made new progress in their political struggles. They have increased activities to oppose enemy robbery, shellings, and bombings and have demanded that he compensate for the losses he has caused (the struggle in Phước Vĩnh Village consisted of over 100 participants). They have participated in many sabotage activities (90 people). They have struggled against the enemy on a permanent basis on Routes 2, 14, and 16 (30 families in the Tân Bình area and 20 families in the Bó Lá area have returned to their former hamlets). In Bàu Hầm Village (Vĩnh Cửu District), the people have risen up to oppose the GVN by destroying their family status cards and People's Self-Defense Force members' cards. In some places, they have denounced spies to the Revolution and unmasked those who commit crimes, etc ((sic)). In Thủ Dầu Một and Biên Hòa Cities, workers, students, and drivers have also initiated struggles (these struggles were larger than those conducted in Biên Hòa and Thủ Dầu Một Cities in Apr and May 72). In addition, struggles against enemy conscription have been developed. In Lái Thiêu District, we have succeeded in maintaining security, keeping youths from joining the GVN armed organizations, annihilating tyrants at night, and living legally among the people during the day. In conclusion, the fighting spirit and political pride of the people have been heightened. This proves that our people have believed in each other and positively participated in activities to destroy the enemy in local areas, and especially in main objective areas. The people do not complain about their losses of property and have decided to fight the enemy until the bitter end, even in tense situations.

CDEC Doc Log No. 09-1255-72

((Page 2 of O.T.))

Our military proselyting activities have also been developed. The people, enemy troops, and their dependents have been indoctrinated on the ten proselyting policies. The revolts among enemy troops have not yet been widely initiated. However, during this month, our two penetration agents have succeeded in coordinating with our forces on the outside to initiate an uprising to annihilate tyrants, attack posts, and seize weapons of the People's Self-Defense Force. We will be more successful in the future. In many places, the RVNAF troops are sympathetic with the people and have let them return to their former hamlets. They did not fire at us as we conducted propaganda by using megaphones around their posts and incited them to refuse orders of their higher echelons, etc ... ((sic)). As a result, 249 RVNAF troops' dependents have been indoctrinated and 56 Regional Force members, four People's Self Defense Force members (two in Châu Thành and two in Tân Uyên District), and one People's Self-Defense Force group in Lai Thiệu District have been disorganized.

The above achievements prove that our forces fully understand the strategic determination of the Central Headquarters and Directive CT/03 for 1972. Therefore, they have eliminated shirking attitudes and are determined to fight the enemy. Some of them have daringly attacked the enemy in hamlets and main objective areas in ((Thủ Biên)) Sub-Region, Bàu Hầm Village, and Vĩnh Cửu and Lai Thiệu Districts, although the enemy outnumbered them. (They attacked the enemy successfully during the first days.) Since then, they have made new progress in attacking, uprising, and concentrating forces in primary and secondary objectives to continually destroy the enemy.

Our forces have also made new progress in providing leadership, controlling subordinate members, and keeping abreast of the situation, particularly in primary objectives.

B. However, our achievements have not met the criteria prescribed for Jun 72 and are not commensurate with our capabilities.

Our forces have disorganized the 306th Regional Force Bn and four Regional Force groups (particularly the group in Phú Giao District). However, we have not yet been able to annihilate many tyrants or destroy enemy squads or platoons. Generally, we have weakened and demoralized the enemy troops and broken the oppressive enemy control in local areas besides liberating hamlets and villages. We have destroyed many enemy troops in Vĩnh Cửu and Lai Thiệu Districts but very few in Châu Thành and Tân Uyên Districts. We have not yet been able to drive the enemy into the defensive or break his oppressive control to seize power in these districts in compliance with the requirements. Very few people relocated by the enemy return to their former hamlets. People in Southern Tân Uyên and Southern Vĩnh Cửu Districts and southwestern Châu Thành District are still hesitant to return to their former hamlets. In Lai Thiệu and southeastern Châu Thành Districts where we have suffered losses, we still face many difficulties in destroying the enemy.

The movements in towns and cities have been stepped up but it is not continuously and strongly developed. We have not been successful in annihilating tyrants and ringleaders in the district and province capitals. The revolutionary movement in sectors and sub-sectors still remains slow.

CDEC Doc Log No. 09-1255-72

((Page 3 of O.T.))

We have been successful in recruiting personnel, but we have not met the increasing requirements. The present achievements are smaller than those we gained in Apr and May 72. This weakness is due to violent enemy counterattacks and our poor observance of guidelines in leadership.

We have tried to make the Party headquarters and armed force members fully understand the strategic determination of the higher echelon and missions to be carried out in Jun and Jul 72; however, our lower-level cadre (at village and hamlet levels) have failed to understand them.

In some local areas, they do not place full confidence in our capabilities to implement the activity plan of the Front. For that reason, they are not flexible in leadership or highly determined to fight the enemy. They do not provide effective guidance for village and hamlet cadre to conduct three-pronged attacks or to lead the people's uprisings and guerrilla warfare movement. Some units have tried to fight the enemy, but they have failed to gain great victories. Other units suffered losses and dared not engage the enemy. Some members have even deserted and guided enemy troops to attack the friendly forces such as in Lai Thiệu and Châu Thành Districts. Some local units have mistaken friendly for enemy troops and have fired at each other (two cases in Châu Thành District).

We did not work out specific plans or make efforts to motivate the people to rise up, nor did we comply with the policy toward the people. The motivation of the people did not keep pace with organization. For these reasons, the people's uprising movement is weak and the development of the friendly forces is slow.

As a result of the study of Directive No. 03CT/72, the ideological attitudes of members of the three forces have been improved and their determination strengthened.

In Jun 72, some units continuously attacked the enemy and properly applied ((three-pronged attacks)) against the enemy (such as those in the sub-region and Vĩnh Cửu District).

However, some cadre did not display a high determination to fight, nor did they stay close to the enemy. They also displayed hesitating attitudes or dared not pursue the enemy (such as some district Local Force units). The command ability of cadre in some units is still poor, and the tactical and technical skills of soldiers, especially of recruits, are not improved.

((Page 4 of O.T.))

As a consequence, instead of winning greater victories and destroying the enemy completely, our units have attained few achievements with many casualties. The methods of encircling the enemy with three forces, the training and use of guerrillas, and the observance of combat regulations are still poor and have resulted in losses recently experienced by our units (the two cases in Châu Thành District are examples.)

CDEC Doc Log No. 09-1255-72

A large number of our cadre and Party members have not succeeded in playing their vanguard role (especially in destroying RVN People's Self-Defense Forces, conducting political struggles, or bringing the people back to their villages and hamlets). They have not been highly determined to implement the Party's resolution and have failed to motivate the people to participate in the revolutionary task. In some areas, the attitudes of our cadre and their family members were open to criticism.

In leadership, the following weaknesses still remain:

In some areas, we do not properly carry out activity plans. Proper leadership is not provided in time to help lower echelons perform their duties. There is a lack of flexibility and creativeness in the implementation of activity plans.

II. PLAN FOR JUL AND AUG 72

Develop victories achieved in Jun 72 and be determined to overcome all difficulties and weaknesses to step up uprisings in Jul and Aug ((72)). In Jul ((72)), we must fulfill the requirements prescribed by the sub-region for Jun and Jul ((72)). We should inflict heavier casualties on the ((RVN)) Regional Force Mobile Battalion in Bình Dương Sector, destroy two other Regional Force groups, break the oppressive enemy control of the population, expand liberated areas, bring the people back to their villages, gain control, strengthen our forces, and turn the balance of power in our favor thus creating favorable conditions for the achievement of greater victories in the months to come.

A. Specific requirements

1. Military: Concentrate our forces in the sub-region and districts to annihilate from ((blank)) to ((blank)) units of the ((RVN)) Regional Force in the sector and popular force in objective areas, overrun posts, kill tyrants and ringleaders in the districts and the province capital, destroy enemy war facilities (storage areas in enemy rear bases), and execute deep thrusts into sectors and sub-sectors.

((Page 5 of O.T.))

In addition, we should try to develop the guerrilla warfare movement, improve overt and covert guerrillas' skills, eliminate tyrants, break the enemy's oppressive control, and coordinate with the three forces ((Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla force)) to conduct three-pronged attacks and encircle enemy posts.

The Military Affairs Party Committee and the Sub-Region Headquarters will later send specific plans to all local areas. Following are important requirements to be fulfilled:

Armed forces of the sub-Region should rapidly reorganized their units, study lessons learned, prepare combat plans as prescribed, and get weapons and ammunition ready for a climaxing activity phase in Jul 72 to attain greater achievements. They should increase the members' ideological awareness and technical and tactical skills so that each unit can completely destroy an enemy company and concentrate its strength to launch attacks with one or two battalion size units. They should increase their cadre's skills to enable them to provide effective command and take prompt and flexible action in combat. They should

CDEC Doc Log No. 09-1255-72

launch daring attacks ((against the enemy)), especially when he is out of his fortifications (or closely coordinate with sappers and fifth columnists to attack him in his defensive positions). They should encircle or ambush the enemy and destroy him. In addition, all armed forces should not leave any KIA or WIA on the battlefield. They should take care of WIA so that the latter can rapidly recover their health and return to the front line. At the same time, they should motivate youths to join the army. By (early) Jul 72, CT and TU ((possibly Châu-Thành and Tân Uyên)) Districts should provide 15 recruits to reinforce the armed forces of the Sub-Region. Sapper units of the Sub-Region should closely coordinate with infantry units and fifth columnists to attack and overrun enemy posts and watchtowers.

District units should concentrate efforts on attacking the immediate objectives in their districts, destroying squads and platoons of ((RVNAF)) Regional and Popular Forces. They should oppress and ambush these forces, disrupt their sweep operations, and force them to remain in their posts ((or hamlets)). They should coordinate with guerrillas to encircle and attack the enemy continuously.

The guerrilla warfare movement (militia and overt and covert guerrillas) should strictly observe the guidelines of the higher echelon to continuously eliminate tyrants and break the oppressive enemy control. They should coordinate with military proselyting and political activities to encircle and attack the enemy in accordance with the situation in their local areas. To gain experiences, district units and district political cadre should command and lead guerrillas to operate deep into objective areas.

To ensure that our three forces effectively attack the enemy, we should intensify political indoctrination, improve the technical and tactical skills of soldiers especially recruits, and attach due importance to troop messing. We should motivate civilian laborers and mobilize all means of transportation to supply these forces with sufficient food provisions to continuously attack the enemy.

2. The people's uprising and military proselyting attack

We should, at all costs, initiate people's uprisings and conduct three-pronged attacks against the enemy, break his oppressive control, disorganize the People's Self-Defense Force, encircle posts, and bring the people back to ((their

((Page 6 of O.T.))

native villages)). In addition, we should fulfill the following requirements:

a. We should motivate the people to rise up ((against the enemy)) kill tyrants, break the enemy's oppressive control, disorganize the People's Self-Defense Force, liberate villages, and seize power.

In weak areas where our agents are inadequate, we should use armed propaganda ((units)) and underground agents to spread propaganda legally and semi-legally, urging the people to defend themselves and seize power. (We should use all forms of propaganda to motivate the people on a broad front.)

Motivation should comply with the policy towards the people. Key cadre and Party members should suggest that the people discuss their local problems and requirements and lead them ((to struggle)). Local agents should be trained on the methods of motivating the people so that they can assemble and lead the masses to struggle against enemy terrorism, airstrikes, artillery fire, and conscription of youths.

They should motivate the people to encircle enemy posts and return to their native villages. They should rally them into organizations, then, depending on the local situation and capability, apply appropriate forms to struggle for their rights.

b. Leadership over the people's struggles against enemy terrorism and conscription of youths.

We should try to motivate the people to initiate an antiterrorism movement. In areas of fierce battles, we should urge the people to wage demonstrations at enemy posts, at his artillery positions, and in the city to oppose indiscriminate fire.

We should step up the movement against enemy conscription of youths and at the same time encourage draft dodgers. Party members and key cadre should contact youths, form them into groups to protect themselves, and motivate them to join the Revolution. Youth Groups should coordinate with military and finance cadre of the Sub-Region to conduct a training course for youths and the People's Self-Defense Force deserters and motivate them to join the revolutionary army. (Youth Group cadre should indoctrinate them; military cadre should lead them to the training area; and finance cadre should provide them with food provisions.)

We should conduct three-pronged attacks to encircle the enemy. We should use to the utmost the three forces, especially the guerrilla force, to motivate the people to struggle against the enemy and appeal to the ((RVNAF)) soldiers and their dependents to sabotage communication lines.

d. We should try to bring the people back to their native villages and solve their problems. In hamlets surrounding the rear base, key cadre and Party members should play the vanguard role and set good examples in leading the people (especially in the Ho-La area) to struggle against enemy terrorism, airstrikes, and artillery fire.

((Page 7 of O.T.))

The people should be motivated to eliminate tyrants and break the enemy's oppressive control and village administrative machinery. To attain such a goal, we should strengthen the solidarity among the people and rally them into organizations.

We should make the people aware of their responsibilities so that they daringly denounce reactionaries of the Revolution. We should, depending on the situation in each local area, use the people to oppress reactionaries. We should indoctrinate and persuade those whose sons and brothers who serve in the enemy's administration, the People's Self-Defense Force, and Popular Force to call them to support the Revolution.

In addition, we should motivate the people to break any other forms of oppressive enemy control.

Proselyting activities

We should indoctrinate the people on our ten-point proselyting policy and make them believe and act in accordance with this policy. We should train RVNAF soldiers' dependents on the use of family relations to proselyte their husbands, sons, and relatives to support the Revolution. We should try to disseminate our ten-point military proselyting policy to each ((RVNAF)) soldier, use megaphones to disseminate propaganda, and spread leaflets and hang slogans along routes.

CDEC Doc Log No. 09-1255-72

We should recruit agents and use them as fifth-columnists to initiate uprisings and revolts. We should indoctrinate old agents and assign them to spread propaganda and recruit new agents. We should assign military proselyting cadre to follow up the activities of each enemy soldier or administrative personnel. We should concentrate our personnel in each area of emphasis, coordinate with three-pronged attacks and try to conduct military proselyting on a large front.

3. In towns and cities, we should continue to carry out the proselyting activity plan for Jun 72 and fulfill the prescribed requirements. We should use overt and covert guerrillas, special action units, and sappers to attack tyrants and ringleaders in ((RVN)) sub-sectors and sections.

In hamlets and areas surrounding the city, we should be determined to fight and disrupt the enemy's oppressive control and the People's Self-Defense Forces, suppress spies, establish penetration areas, and expand the people's control. In hamlets surrounding district seats where the people are relocated, we should motivate them to struggle, destroy enemy resettlement centers, and return to their native villages and hamlets.

III. GUIDANCE AND LEADERSHIP

1. The objective area of the sub-region and the districts remains unchanged.

a. The objective area of the sub-region is divided into two sub-areas.

As prescribed for Jul 72, efforts are to be concentrated on fulfilling the following criteria in Sub-Area I, objective ... ((sic)).

High degree of attainment: liberate the entire sub-area.

Average degree of attainment: liberate hamlets ... ((sic)) and exert pressure on others hamlets ... ((sic))

Low degree of attainment: liberate hamlets ... ((sic)) and exert pressure on hamlets... ((sic))

In villages ... ((sic)), we should contain the enemy in one of their posts.

On the 2nd of Jul 72, we should attain the above criteria, at least the lowest one.

In Aug 72, we should shift activities to Sub-Area II.

((Page 8 of O.T.))

b. The main objectives to be destroyed in the district remain unchanged. Greater efforts should be made to operate in villages in Vinh Cửu District in Jun 72. One element should be assigned to operate in... ((sic)) village. We should step up local movements and recruit agents for Aug 72. We should realize that if the US troops withdraw from these areas, the situation will turn in our favor.

c. We should create favorable conditions to destroy secondary objectives in the districts in Thủ Biên Sub-Region to facilitate the destruction of main objectives in these areas.

CDEC Doc Log No. 09-1255-72

2. Ideological task

a. Refresher training and ideological indoctrination should be conducted for cadre and combatants so that they can seize opportunities to fight the enemy in villages and hamlets and assess the friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses. They should strengthen their determination to continuously attack the enemy. They should eliminate wait-and-see attitudes, false hopes for peace, and reliance on political solutions. They should believe in friendly capabilities to destroy the enemy. We should make cadre, soldiers and agents fully understand the three-pronged attack tactics and improve their combat tactics and techniques. We should also pay much attention to developing secret forces and promoting the leading role of unit cadre.

A review on activities in Jun 72 should be made to study the friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses in local areas and to improve the working procedures, promote the leading role of cadre, and increase their leadership ability.

b. The following should be done to motivate the people:

Provide effective leadership to motivate the people.

Use all means to widely motivate the people.

We should organize the people into groups after we have motivated them. In weak areas, we should motivate them in legal or semi-legal groups.

3. Leadership and implementation of plans

a. We should make each unit (especially secret forces) in villages or hamlets clearly understand the general requirements and the specific requirements in each area.

((Page 9 of O.T.))

b. We should increase the leadership in main objectives and make our agents fully understand their missions. Elements operating in main objectives must have full information on their areas of responsibility and provide proper guidance to other elements operating in secondary objectives.

c. We should provide guidance for our forces to conduct three-pronged attacks, especially in main objectives. Concerning armed activities, efforts should be made to step up the guerrilla warfare movement (assign one or two cadre in the district unit to provide direct leadership in one or two specific areas in order to learn by experience).

d. Improve the physical condition of cadre and troops, and provide replacements to the sub-region units. Take care of wounded and sick soldiers so that they can resume their combat activities as soon as possible and recruit youths from various districts. By Jul 72, CT and TU ((possibly Châu Thành and Tân Uyên Districts)) are to provide 30 recruits and Vinh Cửu District, 10 for the sub-region. In addition, reorganize all agencies ((in the sub-region)) so that a number of their personnel can participate in combat.

CDEC Doc Log No..09-1255-72

e. ((RVNAF)) draft dodgers, and People's Self-Defense Force deserters should be sent to the rear for training and encouraged to enlist in the revolutionary force.

f. Thủ¹ ((Đầu M¹ot)) and Bi¹ên ((H¹oà)) Cities must study this circular and work out proper plans for leadership.

6 Jul 72

For the Current Affairs Committee
of the ((Thủ Bi¹ên)) Sub-Region.
/S/ Nguyễn Văn Tr²úc.

-----END OF TRANSLATION-----